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Abstract
This study examined the relationships between total costs of care and total readmission
rates for Medicare patients undergoing major joint replacement of the lower extremity
(knee/hip arthroplasty) at one of four Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI) facilities
participating in both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the BPCI program by using complete Medicare
claims data for beneficiaries. Both univariate and multivariate models were utilized to
examine the impact of the BPCI initiative on costs and readmissions. Findings from this
study suggest a relationship between Phase 2 BPCI participation and decreased costs.
Hospitals participating in the Phase 2 BPCI program had total episode costs that were
$3,333 per episode lower than hospitals participating in the Phase 1 BPCI program. There
was no statistically significant evidence of decreased readmissions for Phase 2 BPCI
participants.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As health care shifts into a new era of reform, providers and payers are testing
innovative payment models in an effort to keep healthcare costs down while improving
quality. The Affordable Care Act issued the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) a directive to form an innovation center to explore new payment models that would
begin shifting from a pay-for-service model to a pay-for-value model (Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services [CMS], 2010). Developing the capacity to provide value-based
health care has become the goal of healthcare providers.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act “marks the U.S. government’s
commitment to the widespread adoption of patient-centered approaches, coordinated
models of care, and rational reimbursement” (Dinan, Simmons, & Snyderman, 2010, p.
1665). The Institute for Healthcare Improvement established the triple aim framework for
all value programs in order to: (a) improve an individual’s experience of care, (b) improve
the health of the population, and (c) reduce the costs of care (Vetter, Boudreaux, Jones,
Hunter, & Pittet, 2014). Value in this new-era healthcare market will achieve higher quality
outcomes with improved efficiency and providers will be expected to provide care across
the entire care continuum (King, 2013).

2

Background & Need
Traditional healthcare delivery systems are not capable of meeting the needs of the
patient population or providing the necessary resources to address the rapid growth of
chronic diseases in the United States (Ferrario, Moore, & Copeland, 2009). Because the
resources currently being utilized are unable to be sustained, the CMS began exploring
value-based payment models as an alternative to how health care is delivered in the United
States. An Institute of Medicine report highlighted the need for change, estimating that “30
to 40 cents of every health care dollar is spent on inappropriate, duplicative, or ineffective
care, costing the nation between $600 and $700 billion annually” (as cited in Shomaker,
2010, p. 756). Surgical care alone “currently accounts for an estimated 52% of hospital
admission expenses in the United States” (Vetter, Boudreaux, Jones, Hunter & Pittet, 2014,
p. 1131). The Affordable Care Act includes provisions to improve the quality of care;
develop new models of care delivery (i.e., care redesign); ensure appropriately priced
services; modernize the U.S. health system; and fight against waste, fraud, and abuse
(Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS], 2010).
Borah et al. (2012) described the shift to value-based care as a bold transformation
by Medicare to become actively involved in quality of outcomes for Medicare
beneficiaries. The current Medicare fee-for-service model supports volume rather than
quality, which can lead to misaligned incentives for providers and payers to collaborate
and coordinate better care for beneficiaries (Delisle, 2013). In order to make the shift to a
value-based care model that rewards physicians and health systems for quality outcomes
(Froimson, Deadwiler, Schill, & Cousineau, 2013), care redesign is required. The current
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healthcare system leaves the care of Medicare beneficiaries uncoordinated and increases
healthcare costs to an unsustainable level (Hackbarth, Reischauer, & Mutti, 2008).
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services: BPCI Program
One of the value-based care models developed through the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Innovation Center (CMMI) is the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
(BPCI) initiative. The BPCI model is a new innovative episode-based payment approach
that focuses on improving patient experience and quality while decreasing costs (See Table
1). The primary goal of the BPCI program is to redesign the care delivery model by
increasing care coordination among providers. The bundled payment model is designed to
incentivize providers to “deliver the right mix of services at the right time” while shifting
risk from the payer to the provider (Averill, Goldfield, Hughes, Eisenhandler, & Vertrees,
2009, p. 241).
Upon official CMS launch of the program January 2013, there were more than 500
hospitals, health systems and other providers enrolled with 191 of those enrolled in Model
2 (Herman, 2013). The first participants started the Phase 2 (at financial risk) program
October 1, 2013. Participant entry into Phase 2 of the program is optional allowing
participants to stay in Phase 1 of the program indefinitely. Participants entering Phase 2 of
the program agree to a three year commitment to the program, but CMS does offer
provisions to opt out of the Phase 2 program if requested. CMS offered participants 48
clinical episodes to choose from for program participation (See Table 2). Providers have
the option to provide care for a 30, 60, or 90 day episode of care. The episodes of care are
linked to Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG’s) and the BPCI episode of care is triggered
when a Medicare beneficiary with one of those DRG’s enters an acute hospital. The most
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common clinical episodes selected were: major joint replacement (78%), congestive heart
failure (58%), coronary artery bypass graft (51%), chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease—bronchitis/asthma (49%) and percutaneous coronary intervention (48%)
(Herman, 2013).
Traditionally, Medicare makes separate payments to each provider for each service
provided to a beneficiary during a single illness (episode) of care. This approach can result
in fragmented care in which providers are rewarded for the quantity of care provided, not
the quality of care provided. Episode-based payment bundles all Medicare payments for
services related to a clinical condition for a determined amount of time. The goal of the
model is to decrease the fragmented care delivery system by aligning all payment
incentives among the providers of care for a Medicare beneficiary.
CMS has publically voiced the expectation that the BPCI model will lead to
required bundled payment models in the future, but no mandatory BPCI program
announcements have been released at this time. This program is based on the belief that
providers look beyond a single setting of care to an entire episode of care to improve
clinical outcomes (Tian, DeJong, Munin, & Smout, 2010). The program moves the focus
from accountability only for a procedure or hospitalization to a model that holds providers
accountable for improving the total episode of care (Pappas, 2013). In addition to the
economic challenges of the current fee-for-service model, there is a perception, supported
with data, that healthcare services are over utilized and that patient safety is compromised
in the current fee for service model (McIntyre, 2013).
The BPCI program is comprised of four models of care which all link payments for
multiple services beneficiaries receive during an episode of care. Model 1 focuses on acute
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care hospitalization. Models 2 and 3 involve a retrospective bundled payment arrangement
in which actual expenses are reconciled against a target price for an episode of care. In
model 2, the episode of care includes the inpatient hospital stay and all other related
services during the episode of care (See Table 3). This episode ends at 30, 60, or 90 days
after hospital discharge. Model 4 is a prospective bundled payment, where a lump sum
payment is made to provide for an entire episode of care. During BPCI models 1, 2, and 3
all healthcare providers continue to be paid on a fee-for-service model (See Table 4). The
BPCI reconciliation is done on a retrospective basis after all the care has been delivered
and paid for. CMS and the participant facility enter into the bundled payment agreement
and only the facility is at downside financial risk in this payment model. No other
healthcare providers are at any financial risk.
The BPCI program is divided into two phases. Phase 1 of the program is an information
gathering (no financial risk) phase in which facilities are given CMS claims data on DRG
episodes to determine if the facility would like to enter into the Phase 2 (at financial risk)
BPCI program. In Phase 2, the facility and CMS enter into a three-year bundled payment
agreement which includes downside risk to the facility. If the facility can financially
manage the episode of care under the target cost set by CMS the facility will receive a
savings check from CMS. If the facility goes over the target price per episode then the
facility has to reimburse CMS for the dollars that were over the target.
There are different ways to participate in BPCI. Individual participants may enter into
an agreement with CMS directly or a convening organization that coordinates multiple
health care providers’ participation in BPCI can enter into the agreement with CMS.
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Awardee conveners bear all the financial risk for the model for all the participants that they
convene for.
Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI): The New Era of Health Care
The focus of this research study is on the CHI journey in the CMS BPCI program. The
current CHI area of expertise in this program is in the area of major joint replacement of
the lower extremity. To understand the motivation for CHI’s participation in value-based
programs you must first understand the organization’s history. Catholic Health Initiatives
was founded in 1996 by 12 women religious congregations coming together to create one
non-profit faith based organization dedicated to caring for those in need with one mission
statement. The current CHI mission statement continues to honor the original founders:
“The mission of Catholic Health Initiatives is to nurture the healing ministry of the Church,
supported by education and research. Fidelity to the Gospel urges us to emphasize human
dignity and social justice as we create healthier communities” (CHI, 2014, p. 2). As one
of the nation’s largest faith-based health systems, CHI serves more than four million people
each year with 105 hospitals in 19 states. About 46 million people—or nearly 15 percent
of the U.S. population—live within a 60-mile radius of a CHI hospital.
CHI has made a commitment to providing value based care reflecting this
commitment in their strategic plan (CHI, 2014, p.1) making this statement:
“A revolution in health care is upon us. For the first time ever, market forces are
coming together to shape an environment that rewards health care providers and
organizations for going beyond delivering services-to improving health. This is the
very vision on which Catholic Health Initiatives was founded. The changing face of
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health care marks an unprecedented opportunity for us to bring our mission to life
with new relevance and renewed determination. It calls us to strengthen ourselves
as a system, reinvent the way we do things, introduce innovative programs and
relentlessly focus on those we are blessed to serve. By boldly transforming for the
future—what we call The Next Era of Healthy Communities—CHI honor the
pioneering spirit of those who founded us. Today, the people of CHI hold dear the
legacy entrusted to us. And, like our founders, we are called to transform the times”
Catholic Health Initiatives entered into the Phase 2 BPCI project as an awardee
Convener on October 1, 2013. CHI was the convener for St. Vincent Medical Center in
Little Rock, AR which was one of thirteen hospitals across the nation to go at risk during
this first phase out of 450 hospitals/post-acute providers across 44 states that applied to
CMS to participate in the program (CMS, 2013). St. Vincent Medical Center entered into
the BPCI program to manage MS-DRGs 469/470, major joint replacement of the lower
extremity (hip/knee arthroplasty). On January 1, 2014 CHI acted as the convener for three
additional facilities to enter the program to manage MS-DRGs 469/470: Alegent Mercy
Medical Center in Council Bluffs, IA, Good Samaritan Medical Center in Kearney, NE,
and St. Elizabeth Medical Center in Lincoln, NE.
Problem Statement
Despite the large volume of pay-for value programs, such as BPCI, now active in
the United States, research reveals that there is “limited evidence to support the
effectiveness of this approach” (Ryan and Doran, 2012, p. 195).
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Research Question
What is the impact of bundled payments on cost and quality?
Research Hypothesis 1:
Participation in the Phase 2 BPCI program improves care coordination which leads to
decreased costs per episode of care.
Research Hypothesis 2:
Participation in the Phase 2 BPCI program improves quality which leads to decreased
readmission rates per episode of care.
Sample
This study was based on complete Medicare claims data for Medicare beneficiaries in
the clinical episode of care DRGs 469/470: major joint replacement of the lower extremity
(i.e., hip/knee arthroplasty) who (a) received surgery at one of the four CHI facilities (i.e.,
St. Vincent, Alegent Mercy, Good Samaritan, or St. Elizabeth) and (b) the facility
participated in both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 BPCI programs. The CHI BPCI facility
geographic representation includes the states of Arkansas, Iowa, and Nebraska. The
assumption was that the hospitals selected were similar in economic, political, and other
market competitive forces.
Definitions
Key definitions in this research study are:
1) BPCI: Bundled Payment Care Improvement
2) CMS: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
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3) CMMI: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation
4) MS-DRG: Medicare Severity Diagnostic Related Group is a system to classify
hospital cases into one groups for reimbursement.
5) Total Hip/Knee Arthroplasty: Joint replacement of the hip or knee
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

History and Overview of Bundled Payments
Bundled payments date back to 1984 when the Texas heart Institute developed a
bundled payment pricing model for cardiovascular services which was proven effective in
decreasing costs for coronary artery bypass surgery (Froimson et. al, 2013). Other
organizations followed, and Geisinger Health introduced their Proven Care model in 2006
which also focused on coronary artery bypass surgery. The Geisinger Proven Care model
results were excellent: “100% compliance with care protocols, a 44% decrease in
readmissions, and a 16% reduction in length of stay” (Shomaker, 2010, p. 757).
In 2006 the PROMETHEUS (Provider payment Reform for Outcomes, Margins,
Evidence,

Transparency,

Hassle-reduction,

Excellence,

Understandability,

and

Sustainability) bundled payment project was developed by PROMETHEUS Payment Inc.
tying evidenced based payment rates to various conditions (Froimson et. al, 2013). As of
2010, there were more than 150 pay-for performance programs, but unfortunately “many
have shown inconsistent results in controlling health care costs” (Fromison et. al, 2013).
After seeing the success of the Geisinger project, the commercial payers wanted to
engage in bundled payment models. United Health entered into an Oncology bundled
payment model in 2011 hoping they could demonstrate the success in Oncology that others
had achieved in the Cardiac area (Butcher, 2011).
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One concern voiced in moving commercial bundled models forward to the CMS
was that the private payers used larger financial incentives for providers than the CMS
would likely be able to maintain in the current financial state of affairs for Medicare
(Rosenthal, Landon, Normand, Frank, & Epstein, 2006). It was learned early on that
hospitals which are consistently expensive may face extensive financial risk in a bundled
payment program, but hospitals that are low cost could do very well in this type of model;
therefore finding the best performing hospitals to enter into a bundled payment model was
identified as a key success factor for all payers (Miller et. al, 2011).
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services: History and Overview of Participation
in Bundled Payments
The CMS first attempted work in the bundled payment model in 1991 when they
experimented with episode-based payments for coronary bypass surgery bundling
Medicare Part A and Part B services for admissions, plus any readmissions within 72 hours.
During the first 27 months of this demonstration project, the CMS saved more than $17
million on coronary bypass surgery in four of the participating hospitals (Cromwell,
Dayhoff, & Thoumaian, 1997). Despite the CMS demonstrating a reduction in spending
and improved quality for the seven hospitals that participated, the demonstration faced
intense hospital–industry opposition and was subsequently discontinued (Mechanic, 2011).
In an open letter to Congress in 2003, Don Berwick and other leaders challenged
Congress to make payment for performance a national priority, beginning with Medicare
payments (Berwick, 2003). The letter appealed to bipartisan leaders to (a) follow in the
footsteps of leaders two decades prior who had adopted prospective payments and (b) do
something to improve the health care of Americans. It was evident that commercial payers
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and private healthcare organizations’ work in bundled payment models did not bring
enough value to make significant change. The CMS needed to develop bundled payments
in order for any significant progress to be made (Ginsburg, 2013), as they were the only
payer with sufficient market presence to drive meaningful reform (Mechanic and Altman,
2009).
In 2008, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) recommended
that Congress move into a broader implementation of bundled payments around hospital
episodes with a focus on surgical admissions (as cited in Birkmeyer et al., 2010). In 2009,
the CMS again attempted to employ the bundled payment model with the introduction of
the Medicare Acute Care Episode (ACE) demonstration project. This project included
bundling payments for hospital and physician services provided for certain orthopedic
procedures such as total hip and knee arthroplasty and cardiovascular procedures (Hussey,
Sorbero, Mehrotra, Liu, & Damberg, 2009). The ACE project was voluntary and
participation was poor, with only five hospital systems participating (Mechanic, 2011).
Effectiveness of Value-Based Payment Models
By 2006, 140 public and private payers operated 258 pay-for-performance
programs; however, few programs have undergone a formal evaluation of effectiveness
(Mechanic and Altman, 2009). Knowledge gained from early pay-for-performance work
indicated it would be best to develop episode-payment models that included substantial
physician input. Bertko (2010) showed that pay-for-performance models in California,
which have been running the longest, have had little effect on decreasing costs and
improving quality. Bertko (2010) reported that the small performance bonuses offered by
the program do not motivate the physicians to make the significant changes needed to
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improve quality and decrease costs. Shih, Nicholas, Thumma, Birkmeyer, and Dimick
(2014) stated that other value-based programs, such as the Premier Hospital Quality
Incentive Demonstration (HQID), provided no improvement in surgical outcomes.
Currently it remains untested as to whether episode-based payment models will foster the
system changes that will lead to a coordinated, integrated care delivery system (Hussey,
Sorbero, Mehrotra, Liu, & Damberg, 2009).
There are many payment reform models in place for providers to engage in to
decrease costs, and improve quality and patient experience. Those models include:
accountable care organizations (shared savings), patient centered medical homes (PCMH),
bundled payments, partial capitation, and full capitation (Lowell and Bertko, 2010) (See
Table 5). Episode-based payment models are considered easier to succeed in as a single
physician is often involved in the entire episode of care vs. a global payment model such
as Medicare Shared Savings where there are many physicians caring for a patient during
the accountable payment phase (Cutler and Ghosh, 2012). The involvement of many
providers in the care of a single Medicare beneficiary impedes the ability for any one
provider to influence the overall quality and care for a given patient (Pham et. al, 2007).
Davis (2007) reports that an average Medicare beneficiary sees two primary care
physicians and five specialists in the course of one year further highlighting the need for a
care model that has one team accountable for the care of a patient for a defined episode of
care.
Despite Medicare beneficiaries seeking care from multiple providers, it has been
found that they do receive most of their care from a local delivery system of a set group of
physicians and hospitals leading to the belief that the formation of integrated health care

14

delivery systems will improve the care for Medicare beneficiaries (Fisher, Staiger, Bynum,
& Gottlieb, 2006). Physicians are often on staff at more than one hospitals, but provide the
majority of their care at one single hospital (Weenberg, Fisher, Skinner, and Bronner,
2007).
Value-Based Program Success Factors
In the review of the literature, the following components were consistently included
in the description of effective value-based programs: value-based leadership skills, care
redesign/coordinating care across the continuum, decreasing internal costs, readmission
reduction, post-acute relationship development, patient engagement, and care
management.
Value-Based Program Leadership
Vetter et. al (2014) report the need for strategic, operational, and financial
alignment of payers, hospitals, and physicians and other providers across the care
continuum to succeed in value-based programs. Successful leaders in this work report key
elements of success are a strong vision of patient-centered change as genuinely
transformational, being comfortable with the uncertainty that innovation brings, and a
carefully designed organization structure that sends a consistent message (Millenson,
DiGioia, Greenhouse, & Swieskowski, 2013).
There is increasing belief in the healthcare community that collaboration between
surgeons and non-surgeons can reduce the cost and improve the quality of care (Britt, Hoyt,
Jasak, Jones, & Drapkin, 2013). Britt et. al (2013) found the quality of care was improved
by eliminating duplicate tests, procedures, and imaging when the interdisciplinary team
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worked in collaboration. That kind of collaboration will require transformative leadership
skills by healthcare organizations. To meet the needs of the Affordable Care Act “valuebased leaders must be transformative in purpose and must have character, values, and
qualities of ethical accountability, social responsibility, and working through people to
align the organization for improvement in quality, cost and the patient-and family-centered
experience” (Piper, 2013, p.231).
Achieving the triple aim goals of decreased costs, increased quality and increased
patient satisfaction in the BPCI program require hospitals to implement multiple care
redesign changes. In this model of care the physicians and health care leadership must work
together to develop capacity for integration and coordination of care in order to reform the
health care system (Robinson, 2013).
Care Redesign: Coordinating Care Across the Continuum
Teams that work in the bundled payment model must develop capacity to care for
patients along the entire care continuum. As Fong et. al (2011) describes, a model that
focuses on behavioral change interventions is necessary to achieve long-term success.
Bundled payment model implementation requires significant time and effort (Mead,
Grantham, and Siegel, 2014) and a high functioning inter-professional team. Martin (2014)
defines well-coordinated care as ensuring that the patient is always at the center of the
team. This focus of patient centered care is a critical component to the success of this
program and coordination of care and coordination of the entire team is a strategy that is
important in coordinating care across the entire health care delivery system (Martin, 2014).
For Medicare beneficiaries, 57% of the episodes related to total hip replacement require

16

four or more distinct care settings highlighting the need for care coordination along the
entire care continuum (Mechanic, 2011).
One focus area to keep the patient at the center of the care is in the area of preoperative optimization. Ensuring that patients are clinically optimized prior to surgery is
shown to improve a patient’s clinical outcomes. One area that has received attention is
around pre-operative anemia screening. Preoperative anemia has also been found to be an
“independent predictor of postoperative morbidity and mortality” (Vetter, 2013, p. 51).
Research indicates that in “patients undergoing elective orthopedic surgery have an average
of 24% prevalence of preoperative anemia” (Vetter, 2013, p. 51).
In addition, research finds that high quality care transitions help to change the
normal behaviors of patients automatically returning to the ED when they felt anxiety about
their recovery process. Duckett (2011) summarizes that the work of Coleman, Boult, and
Naylor on the importance of care transitions increased national awareness on what a
difference a good transition plan can make in the health outcomes of patients. The work of
care transitions and the need for effective community engagement strategies with our
community post-acute partners will be required to meet the needs of patients (Kaprielian
et. al, 2013).
Before entering into a bundled payment models providers should ask themselves if
they are (a) capable of taking responsibility for the quality and efficiency with which that
set of services is provided and, (b) are the incentives enough to cover the increased services
that must be provided in the model (Guterman and Schoenbaum, 2010). Bundled payment
models will require increased resources to monitor and follow patients after hospital
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discharge so the incentives to provide that care must be countered by improvement in
quality/costs outcomes for those patients.
Decreasing Internal Costs
Birkmeyer, Gust, Dimick, Birkmeyer, and Skinner (2012) determined the
connection between quality and cost of inpatient surgery, with results revealing that
Medicare payments for inpatient surgery cases were substantially higher at hospitals with
high complications. Pine, Fry, Jones, Meimban, and Pine (2010) established additional
links between costs and quality, finding that effective, efficient hospitals can produce
sizable cost savings and not jeopardize quality outcomes. Pine et al. (2010) found that
“96% of the total savings resulted from improvements in efficiency” (p. 867), which
indicates that inefficiency is more costly than ineffectiveness. Cutler and Ghosh (2012)
found that it is possible to achieve substantial healthcare savings after moving from a feefor-service model to a bundled payment model. Weeks, Rauh, Wadsworth, and Weinstein
(2013) estimated that bundled payment models are the most promising mechanism to
reducing healthcare costs, with a potential of a 5.4% reduction in national healthcare
spending over 10 years. In a bundled payment care delivery model, supply expense and
reduction efforts are needed to ensure there are no potential losses from inefficient
operations and processes (Delisle, 2013).
One of the largest focus areas for decreasing internal costs is in the area of surgical
implants. Expenditures for medical devices were “$ 80 billion in 2007 and constitute one
of the fast growing components of hospital costs” (Burns, Housman, Booth, & Koenig,
2009, p. 2). Orthopedic implants represent a large proportion of device expenditures and
are expected to rise almost 10% annually (Burns et. al, 2009). To combat these high costs,
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surgeons and hospital facilities have to engage in cost-containment strategies which include
standardization of implants using a smaller number of vendors. This physician agreement
is difficult for hospitals to secure as surgeons are reluctant to switch vendors citing both
efficiency and safety reasons (Burns et. al, 2009).
Readmission Prevention Program
There is a clear case for the focus on reducing readmissions. “From 2003 to 2004,
19.5% of all Medicare beneficiaries who were discharged from a hospital were readmitted
within 30 days, leading to an estimated cost of $17.4 billion” (Sweeney, 2013, p. 19). Other
studies confirm that nearly 20% of Medicare fee-for-service patients are re-hospitalized
within 30 days of discharge with more that 50% of patients not seeing a physician between
discharge and readmission highlighting the poor provider coordination at the time of
discharge (Sood, Huckfeldt, Escarce, Grabowski, & Newhouse, 2011). In addition,
research has shown that 24% of patients who enter a skilled nursing facility are readmitted
to a hospital within 30 days of discharge, costing Medicare $4.3 billion in one year alone
(Sood et. al, 2011).
The evidence has shown that the utilization of care management in the care
transition role leads to decreased re-hospitalizations even up to 180 days after hospital
discharge (Berkowitz, Schreiber, and Paasche-Orlow, 2012). Involvement of the acute
hospital nursing staff in taking a more proactive monitoring and evaluation of patients who
have readmitted will also provide valuable insights (Steffens et. al, 2009).
One key strategy found for decreasing readmissions is to collaborate with your ED
physician teams. If ED teams are engaged in the BPCI program they can serve as a first
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line of defense to prevent a BPCI patient readmission by treating and releasing that patient
from the ED instead of admitting for inpatient services (Gaines, 2012).
Several studies have been completed to try to identify common characteristics of
patients undergoing total joint arthroplasty (hip and knee) that require readmission
following surgery. Tayne et. al (2014) found the most common characteristics predicting
increased readmissions were: female gender, high ASA class (ASA class takes into account
the existence of systemic disease and the severity of the disease), and increased operative
time. Saucedo et. al (2013) identified common characteristics were: coronary artery
disease, diabetes, increased LOS, underweight status, obese status, age (over 80 or under
50), and Medicare. Schairer, Sing, Vail and Bozie (2014) identified common characteristics
for total hip replacement patients were: type of procedure, hospital stay of greater than 5
days, cardiac valvular disease, diabetes with end-organ complications, and substance
abuse. Clement (2013) identified common characteristics for total hip replacement patients
were: increased age, length of stay, and body mass index. Estimates are that “8.5% of
primary and 14.1% of revision THA patients are readmitted within 30 days of discharge”
(Clement et. al, 2013, p. 7). Researchers have found that patient age and comorbid
conditions have been found to increase the length of the hospital stay, readmissions, and
mortality after surgery for both total hip and total knee arthroplasty patients (Jorgensen and
Kehlet, 2013).
In studies for all orthopedic surgical admissions (not just total hip and knee
replacements), the findings were similar indicating that the characteristics of patients with
the highest risk of readmission were: longer length of stay in the hospital, spending time in
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the intensive care unit, marital status of widowed, and Medicaid insurance status result in
increased risk for readmission (Dailey, Kasten, Chapman, & Lee, 2013).
Post-Acute Relationships: Development of Continuing Care Networks
Post-acute providers are eager to partner with BPCI teams understanding that in the
current healthcare environment of value-based care programs the performance of postacute providers will be evaluated more closely and will impact incoming referrals (Graham
et. al, 2013). In the BPCI total joint program, the two areas of post-acute utilization that
are highly costly and therefore closely monitored are inpatient rehab and skilled nursing
facility settings. Herbold, Bonistall, and Walsh (2011) determined that patients who
received inpatient rehab following total hip or knee replacement surgeries had a shorter
stay with superior functional outcomes than patients that received skilled nursing facility
care, but cost of stay in rehab was significantly greater. These types of outcomes and costs
analyses are important when designing an optimal care plan for the BPCI patient.
The expenses in the post-acute part of the BPCI episode of care have been found to
heavily contribute to success in this new care delivery model. Post-acute costs are growing
rapidly with an average annual rate of increase at 25% between 1988 and 1997 making it
the fastest growing area of Medicare spending (Buntin, Colla, and Escarce, 2009). In
studying this issue, research has found that bundled payment care models will be most
effective in reducing total episode costs if post-acute services are included in the
accountability as is currently being tested in the CMS BPCI project (Chandra, Dalton, and
Holmes, 2013). The causes for variation in post-acute utilization are complex, but it is
important to recognize that population market factors may influence those decisions
impacting the cost variations (Miller et. al, 2011). For example, surgeons working in a
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market with a large volume of skilled nursing facilities may utilize these facilities more
often due to availability allowing for an earlier discharge from the acute care setting.
Patient Engagement/Post-Acute Telephonic Follow-Up
There is evidence on the success of coordinated care in reducing episode costs for
surgical patients (Hockenberry, Burgess, Glasgow, Vaughn-Sarrazin, & Kaboli, 2013).
The increase in perioperative medical homes and BPCI programs for surgical diagnosis
groups is steadily rising as part of these coordination of care models. Traditionally patients
have delegated decision making to their physicians, but in the new value-based care models
the patient should be actively engaged in the process with implementation of a shared
decision making model (Wennberg et. al, 2007).
Research has also demonstrated the value of telephonic follow-up by care
managers. Riegel et. al (2002) found that there was a reduction in hospitalizations, costs,
and other resource use when a standardized telephonic case management model was
followed in a heart failure patient population. The Riegel et. al (2002) study conclusions
were that telephonic case management can decrease physician office visits, hospital days,
emergency department visits, and re-hospitalization rates. Studies that compare the effects
between home visits and telephonic care management follow-up with telephone calls only
found bundling interventions of home visits and calls were most effective in reducing
readmissions (Wong, Chow, Chan, & Tam, 2014).
Care Managers/Navigators
The role of care managers in these type programs has been shown to improve results
and is supported by the work of Dr. John Kotter. Dr. Kotter recognized the need for

22

collaboration across disciplines to improve health care organizations and has supported
embedding care managers in value-based programs to achieve results (Treadwell and
Giardino, 2014). Nurse navigators are relatively new to the nursing profession as nurses
that typically work with patients to ensure that well-coordinate care is provided (Hader,
2012). Population care coordination nurses are “acting as architects and co-leaders in
transforming the healthcare system” (Christopher, 2014, p.505). The inclusion of nursing
in all of the value-based work has increased their visibility as a required part of the interprofessional team.
Physician Led Inter-Professional Teams
It is important to understand the difference between multidisciplinary care which is
when several disciplines work with patients in parallel vs. inter-professional care which is
a collaborative and integrated care where team members collaboratively work to solve
patients problems (Pecukonis, Doyle and Bliss, 2008). Successful teams in this work report
that “transforming medical care ultimately means transforming what doctors do and how
they do it, and that requires clinical credibility” (Millenson et. al, 2013, p. 331-332).
Inter-professional teams focus on opportunities to reduce care fragmentation and
improve patient outcomes (Treadwell and Giardino, 2014). This collaboration seeks to
improve the understanding of all members of the health care team working with a patient.
Teamwork is described as an essential ingredient, recognizing that no one person has the
expertise to independently achieve all of the necessary changes to adapt to a value-based
care model (Treadwell and Giardino, 2014).For effective results, inter-professional teams
must demonstrate core competencies of: “role clarification, team functioning,
patient/client/family/community-centered care, collaborative leadership, inter-professional
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communication, and inter-professional conflict resolution” (Aston et. al, 2012, p. 950). Due
to the need for this collaborative practice model in value-based care, there has been an
increase in inter-professional education competency requirements in higher education
institutions focused on healthcare (Thistlethwaite et. al, 2014). Results from evaluation of
this model are showing promise with physicians and medical students working on interprofessional teams perceiving that these type teams did provide improved patient care
(Corbridge, Tiffen, Carlucci, & Zar, 2013). It should be noted that inter-professional teams
must have an acknowledgement of the issue of power differentials that exist between
physicians and other health care professionals (Whitehead, 2007) when developing models
for shared responsibility for patient outcomes. Physicians are trained to lead the team so
full collaboration for some physicians may take time to achieve as physicians in this model
must give up some power to the team (Baker, Egan-Lee, Martimianakis, & Reeves, 2010).
The BPCI program requires care redesign from both the hospital teams and the
physician teams. If the physicians do not redesign their care protocols the care redesign
efforts will not succeed. In the bundled payment models, the physician teams must agree
to both inpatient and outpatient care model redesign which is different from the current
models of care. In the BPCI care model, the physicians must develop a multidisciplinary
framework that extends post-discharge that will also ensure high quality outcomes in the
outpatient setting (Fong, 2011).
Leveraging Access to Information: Data Availability
Euclid Hospital is currently participating in the CMS Phase 2 BPCI project and
reports that “tracking outcomes requires a robust infrastructure” (Froimson et. al, 2013, p.
2). The BPCI teams require monthly reports built from the CMS data that can track
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outcomes in the programs. Waiting on quarterly CMS outcome reporting does not allow
the teams the ability to make care redesign changes quickly enough to impact success in
the program.
Summary
There has been little research on the overall effectiveness of the new value-based
payment models in decreasing costs and improving quality. The CMS BPCI program
launched in October 2013 continues to undergo model changes by CMS based on feedback
from program participants. No current research on the effectiveness of the CMS BPCI
program was found for this literature review. The CMS BPCI program is a three year
program and final results of the effectiveness of this model in achieving the triple aim of
improved patient experience, improved quality, and decreased costs is not expected to be
released by the CMS until after the first BPCI participants complete the program on
September 30, 2016.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
CHI BPCI Program Methods
In managing the 90 day BPCI episode of care, the areas identified as most heavily
impacting costs and quality (increased readmissions) in the CHI Phase 2 BPCI programs
were: pre-operative education/optimization, acute care model redesign, patient
engagement/care management, and post-acute provider engagement. In addition, there was
a need identified to establish common roles at CHI for the BPCI program to ensure
consistent program delivery (See Figure 1).
Pre-Operative Education/Optimization
The first step was to design a pre-operative optimization program developed and led
by the physicians to determine if patients were clinically ready for surgery. The clinical
optimization screening process included testing for anemia, sleep apnea, and general
surgical readiness. Patients were required to complete this optimization process prior to
being assigned a surgery date. If clinical needs were identified during the optimization
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process, patients were required to resolve any outstanding issues prior to surgery. Once
patients successfully completed the pre-operative optimization screening process a date
was set for the patient to attend a mandatory education course (“Joint Academy”) focused
on increasing understanding of the surgery and the post-surgical recovery process.
The Joint Academy course included further functional/discharge planning
assessments for surgery readiness and included intensive education on the surgery process
and post-operative process. During the Joint Academy course, patients and their “coach”
(family/friend who would help patient during the post-operative recovery phase) were
introduced to the inter-professional team (Joint Academy Education Coordinator, RN Care
Manager/Navigator, Social Work Care Manager/Navigator, Physician Therapist (PT),
Hospital RN) that would be responsible for their care during the entire 90 day episode of
care. Joint Academy assessments included a functional assessment and discharge planning
assessment. Patients’ pre-operative functioning was assessed by a PT who also instructed
patients on proper completion of required pre-op exercises. The RN/Social Work care
managers met with patients to complete a discharge planning assessment and begin
planning for post-operative discharge needs. After completion of the pre-operative
optimization process and Joint Academy class, patients were medically cleared for surgery,
started on their pre-operative exercise program, and voiced a clear understanding of the
surgery and the required recovery process. In addition, patients and families were clearly
prepared with expected hospital length of stay and plans for discharge following surgery.
With the addition of the pre-operative optimization program and the Joint Academy course
the teams noted clear declines in surgery cancellations, hospital length of stay, need for
post-acute services, and post-operative readmissions.
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Acute Care Redesign
The hospital length of stay and hospital plan of care also required care redesign.
The interdisciplinary team had to make modifications to the typical post-operative plan of
care to add physical therapy on day of surgery, discharge planning reassessment on day of
surgery, and a discharge education course on the morning of discharge to reinforce the
teachings provided pre and post operatively. Hospital care management teams and the care
management/navigators for the BPCI program had to work collaboratively on discharge
planning and plans for follow-up after the hospital discharge. The surgeons were asked to
evaluate their current practices and evaluate options for increasing patient’s mobility on
day of surgery and allow for decreased length of stay in the hospital. Physician and
pharmacy teams collaborated on pain control options to improve pain control for patients
on day of surgery which allowed them the ability to participate in therapy on the afternoon
of surgery. Other physician practice changes was a collaboration with physical therapy for
a more aggressive physical therapy plan post-op which resulted in decreased length of stay.
Patient Engagement/Care Management
The pre-operative optimization and education programs were designed to assist
with readmission prevention by preparing patients for what to expect after surgery. In
addition, the care managers/navigators developed a telephonic follow-up call schedule to
monitor the patients. If a patient entered a post-acute facility post-op, the care managers
would contact the post-acute provider to continue to follow that patient. In addition, the
post-acute facility was required to provide physical therapy progress updates to ensure that
the patients were improving mobility and moving toward discharge home.
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The care managers completed follow-up call with patients calling patients at least
10 times: prior to the Joint Academy course, in-person at the Joint Academy course, inperson day one after surgery during hospital stay, 48 hours after discharge, 7-10 days after
discharge, following the first post-op physician appointment, 30 days after discharge, 60
days after discharge, 90 days after discharge, and 120 days after discharge (See Figure 3).
The team followed a call script (See Figure 5) to guide the calls for program consistency.
Topics covered during the call included: incision care, mobility status, securement of
medications, expectations for recovery. The volume of calls to manage this program was
extensive—ingoing and outgoing calls were tracked and reasons for incoming calls were
also tracked to trend questions/concerns patients were having post-discharge (See Figure
6). For example, one common question was around constipation so the care managers
developed increased pre-operative education on this topic to reduce this concern after
surgery.
After discharge, patients would often have questions about their recovery phase that
they needed to reach out about (ex. Pain, constipation, incision care). Prior to this program
there was no ability for a patient to have 24/7 access to a Care Manager that could assist
with these type questions. Often patients would try to reach out to their physician office,
but if calls were not returned quickly the patient would get anxious and return to the
emergency room. The 24/7 Care Coordination access line provided patients with a
consistent contact number that they could call during their recovery phase to obtain
information or be linked to the physician if required.
The skill set of the care manager in the program proved to be critical to coordinate
the care across the entire 90 day episode continuum. The patients quickly learned that the
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care manager was their “go to” person and should be the first point of contact for any
questions or concerns. Utilizing the expertise of the care managers from the time of pre-op
until 120 days after surgery clearly demonstrated that the care manager was the point
person for the patient and the person who could mobilize other inter-professional team
members to intervene if needed. This central contact person was felt to be one of the key
factors in decreasing readmissions.
CHI partnered with TAVHealth for the BPCI project. TAVHealth worked with the
BPCI teams to develop a standardized workflow process which is then tracked in
TAVConnect. The TAVConnect software solution identifies barriers of care so that the
care management navigators can address those issues that might prevent a full recovery.
Patient engagements with any of the care team members is tracked and measured in
TAVConnect so that all of the team can easily monitor how the patient is progressing. The
real-time reporting provided by TAVHealth to the BPCI team means changes to improve
processes and prevent readmissions can be implement quickly. BPCI populations are then
consistently monitored to allow continuous improvements in the program.
Post-Acute Provider Engagement
Prior to the launch of the BPCI program, the post-acute providers expected to
receive BPCI patients upon hospital discharge were provided education about the program.
In addition, the providers were informed of the expected plan of care/required therapy
protocols/goal length of stay that the BPCI team/physicians expected for these patients.
The facilities were informed that the care managers would be contacting them at least
weekly for updates for the patients in the BPCI program. The providers received education
on data CMS would be sending monthly on costs and length of stay for their facility vs.
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other local facilities providing services to BPCI patients and were informed that data would
be reviewed and tracked by the BPCI leadership team. A continuing care network (CCN)
was established in each market with a BPCI program and consistent expectations for the
skilled nursing facility partners were established and communicated to the network
facilities (See Figure 7). The goal of developing a highly functioning network of post-acute
providers was to provide standardized, evidence-based care seamlessly across continuum
for optimal patient experience.
Utilizing the described CHI BPCI program methods, the teams were able redesign
the care delivery system for these patients, develop capacity to manage care across the
entire care continuum, and achieve success in an episode based payment model.
Research Study Methods
Study Design
We used an ANOVA analysis to assess the relationship between total costs (i.e.,
allowed costs) per episode and total readmissions per episode between Phase 1 and Phase
2 BPCI program participation. Episode payments and readmissions were examined at the
episode level. We used a regression analysis to assess the relationship of age, gender,
BPCI phase, CMI, and site of service (i.e., surgery) location on total costs of the episode
and total readmissions per episode.
Sample and Data Collection
The CMS BPCI data reports contain information for all claims processed for each
beneficiary for the entire episode of care. The actual claims files are contained in 13 files
split by the type of service: Durable Medical Equipment, Outpatient, Home Health, Skilled
Nursing Facility, Professional/Part B, and Inpatient/Long Term Care/Inpatient Rehab. For
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the first time, teams were able to see all CMS claims information for beneficiaries and not
just claims information that occurred at the surgical BPCI facility.
The CMS BPCI data reports include the following information:
Metrics by BPCI Facility
Total # of Episodes
Baseline Price Before Discount
Target Price per Episode

Total Allowed Amount
Winsorized Allowed per Episode
Anchor ALOS
# Readmits

Average Readmits per Episode
Anchor Allowed per Episode
--Anchor Facility Allowed per Episode
--Anchor Prof Allowed per Episode

Readmit Allowed Per Episode
Total Post Allowed per Episode

--OP Allowed per Episode
--ED Allowed per Episode
--SNF Allowed per Episode
--Home Health Allowed per Episode

Definitions
Number of cases billed with selected DRG
at BPCI facility
Average price of episode of care during the
baseline period (2009-2012)
Baseline price minus a required 2%
discount; Programs must come under
target price to achieve savings in this
program
Total amount paid by CMS
Total amount paid by CMS after outlier
calculations are applied
Average Length of Stay in hospital for
episode
Number of inpatient readmissions
following anchor episode during the 90 day
episode of care
Average number of readmits per number of
cases
Total amount paid by CMS for the anchor
(acute care) part of the episode
Total amount paid by CMS for the acute
care part of the episode of care
Total amount paid by CMS for the
professional physician fees during the
acute care part of the episode of care
Total amount paid by CMS for
readmissions per case
Total amount paid by CMS by case for care
that was delivered in the post-acute phase
of the episode
Total amount paid by CMS for outpatient
services per case
Total amount paid by CMS for emergency
department care per case
Total amount paid by CMS for skilled
nursing facility care per case
Total amount paid by CMS for home
health care per case
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--IRF Allowed per Episode
--Prof Allowed Per Episode
--LTC Allowed per Episode
Post 30-day Total Spend

Post 30-day Total Spend per Episode

Total amount paid by CMS for inpatient
rehab facility care per case
Total amount paid by CMS for
professional fees per case
Total amount paid by CMS for long-term
acute care per case
Total amount paid by CMS for total care in
the 30 days following the end of the 90 day
BPCI episode of care
Total amount paid by CMS for total care in
the 30 days following in the end of the 90
day BPCI episode of care per case

The above CMS claims information is provided to CHI and it is loaded into user
reports for the BPCI teams to utilize. The reports provided to the teams range from very
high level summary reports that show the breakout of average type of service costs as a
section of the overall episode cost, to specific detail reports that show individual providers
and their average claim costs compared to other providers of the same type of service.
This research study was based on complete Medicare claims data for Medicare
beneficiaries in the clinical episode of care DRGs 469/470: major joint replacement of the
lower extremity (i.e., hip/knee arthroplasty) who (a) received surgery at one of the four
CHI facilities (i.e., St. Vincent, Alegent Mercy, Good Samaritan, or St. Elizabeth) and (b)
participated in both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 BPCI program. The CHI BPCI facility
geographic representation includes the states of Arkansas, Iowa, and Nebraska. The
assumption was that the hospitals selected were similar in economic, political, and other
market competitive forces.
The unit of analysis for this study was individual patients who were eligible for
participation in the BPCI program by having total hip or knee arthroplasty at one of the
BPCI participating facilities. In this program, the CMS defines: one patient = one episode.
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The data contain all tracked program metrics by patient (i.e., episode) for the duration of
the 90-day BPCI program for each facility participating in the program. Our data came
from one primary source: CMS claims reports for all episodes for each participating BPCI
facility. The CMS protects the data by removing all patient identifying data fields; there is
no way to track the data back to an individual beneficiary. The CMS data included
historical/baseline data from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2012. Additionally, the CMS provides
monthly data reports that outline the current episodes of care that have been completed.
We focused on major joint replacement of the lower extremity joint episodes. Data
was limited to facilities that had both Phase 1 and Phase 2 data. Beneficiaries with more
than one episode were excluded. Gender and case mix index (CMI) were converted to
categorical variables. Readmission count and total costs per episode were used as
continuous variables. A total of 2,603 observations were utilized.
Data Analysis
For each patient, we obtained the total episode bundle cost by summing the index
hospitalization payments with the postoperative post-acute costs to compute the total 90day episode of care cost. Readmissions in this program are defined as any inpatient acute
hospital (Rehab/LTAC are not included) admission following the BPCI trigger inpatient
admission that occurs during the 90-day episode period. The CMS provides a readmission
exclusion list for the BPCI program; thus, any inpatient admission DRG listed on the CMS
exclusion list was removed from the total readmission count. The data relating to the
following performance indicators (i.e., total costs per episode and readmissions) were
collected and analyzed. The year that the Phase 2 BPCI facilities entered the program (2013
or 2014) served as the base year for data analysis. The assumption was that the care
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coordination process and performance improvements required to achieve savings in the
first year of the Phase 2 BPCI program would be demonstrable. The study was limited to
one year (i.e., the first year of Phase 2 BPCI program participation) due to data availability
and the limited sample of CHI hospitals that are currently participating in the program. The
data for the study were collected from CMS claims data files for all relevant MS-DRG
episodes in the participating facilities.
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
The total sample size was 2,603 episodes, with 92% of the BPCI program
participants between 61 and 90 years of age. The largest number of participants included
in this study was from the geographic region of Nebraska, at 57% of the total sample.
Arkansas was the next highest represented (29%), and the smallest population came from
Iowa (14%). Females made up 63% of the sample and males represented 37% of the group.
Ninety-five percent of the sample had a CMI of 2.1 or less. Table 9 presents the descriptive
statistics on variables used to test Hypothesis 1 and 2.

Findings
Findings from this study suggest a relationship between Phase 2 BPCI participation
and decreased costs with inpatient lower extremity total joint replacement. Hospitals
participating in the Phase 2 BPCI program had total episode costs of $3,333 per episode
lower than facilities participating in the Phase 1 BPCI program. There was no statistically
significant evidence of decreased readmissions for Phase 2 BPCI participants.

35

ANOVA Testing Summary: Total Costs per Episode
A proven statistically significant difference existed between the mean of Phase 1
and Phase 2 populations based on total allowed costs per episode. Phase 1 participants had
a higher average total allowed per episode compared to Phase 2 participants. Costs for the
Phase 1 facilities were $25,171 per episode compared to the costs of $21,838 for Phase 2
facilities. Phase 2 participants achieved a total cost per episode reduction of $3,333 (see
Figure 2). Figure 2 provides support for Hypothesis 1: Participation in Phase 2 BPCI
program improves care coordination which leads to decreased costs per episode of care.

ANOVA Testing Findings: Total Readmissions per Episode
No statistically significant difference existed between the mean of Phase 1 and
Phase 2 populations based on total readmissions per episode. Phase 1 participants had a
slightly higher average readmit count compared to Phase 2 participants (see Figure 4).
Figure 4 reflects that no support was established for Hypothesis 2: Participation in the
Phase 2 BPCI program improves quality which leads to decreased readmission rates per
episode of care.
Regression Analysis Testing: Total Costs Allowed per Episode
The independent variables of age, gender, BPCI Phase 2 participation, CMI, and
site of service/surgery all impact total costs per episode. An increased age and higher CMI
(3.4 or higher) demonstrated statistically significant increases to total costs per episode.
The lowest costs per episode were achieved by participants with the following
characteristics: (a) male, (b) a CMI of 2.1 or lower, (c) in a Phase 2 BPCI program, and (d)
surgery in Arkansas/St. Vincent Medical Center (see Table 6).
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Regression Analysis Testing: Total Readmissions Allowed per Episode
No statistically significant difference existed between the mean of Phase 1 and
Phase 2 populations based on total readmissions per episode. Phase 1 participants had a
higher average total readmission count per episode compared to Phase 2 participants. An
increased age and higher CMI appeared to have an impact on total readmissions, but a
statistically significant impact could be proven with this research study. Of note, the total
volume of readmissions for this study was 332 of 2,602 cases; thus, the sample size may
have limited the regression analysis findings (see Table 7).
Although not a statistically significant finding, Phase 2 BPCI participation did
reflect a relationship between readmissions reduction in increased age and higher CMI
groups; this is positive, as it shows the program can have an impact on improving quality
for total joint replacement patients.
Limitations
Some limitations for this research study include: (a) reliance on CMS claims data;
(b) inclusion of only CHI facilities in the sample; (c) only one clinical episode represented;
(d) limited sample size; and (e) comparing facilities not matched by size, geographic area,
number of cases, or number of surgeons participating in the program.

Practice Implications
Findings from this study have direct implications for ongoing episode-based
payment initiatives aimed at improving quality and patient experience while decreasing
costs. Our findings suggest that episode-based payment models have the potential to
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decrease total costs per episode. The study focus of total knee arthroplasty as a BPCI
episode is important, as the available data reveal that total knee arthroplasty is now among
the most common major surgical procedures, with approximately 600,000 total knee
procedures, at a total expense of $9 billion per year, performed annually in the United
States (Cram et al., 2012). In this estimation of 600,000 total knee procedures per year in
the United States, our research predicts that the implementation of the BPCI model could
result in an overall savings of approximately $2 billion per year. For CHI alone, our
research indicates that the Phase 2 BPCI program reduced total costs for the 1,279 episodes
by a total of $4.2 million. In the CMS BPCI program, the savings achieved by the facilities
are shared with the CMS so CHI did not maintain 100% of those savings, but positive
savings ratios were still achieved in this program by CHI.
The results of this study do not directly suggest that episode-based payment models
improve quality outcomes, but the positive relationships on the BPCI model with
readmission reduction in relationship to age and CMI warrant more study. Future research
could include a more intense focus on patients in the program that are older and have a
CMI of 3.4 or greater in order to produce statistically significant reductions in total
readmissions.
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Abstract
Background: The Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative is a
value-based episode-based care model developed through the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) focused on improving patient experience and quality while
decreasing costs.
Purpose: To examine relationships between total costs of care and total readmission
rates for Medicare patients undergoing major joint replacement of the lower extremity
(knee/hip arthroplasty) at Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI) facilities participating in the
BPCI program.
Methodology/Approach: This study used complete Medicare claims data for
beneficiaries in the clinical episode of care DRGs 469/470 receiving major joint
replacement of the lower extremity surgery at one of the four (CHI) facilities participating
in both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 BPCI program. Both univariate and multivariate models
were utilized to examine the impact of the BPCI initiative on costs and readmissions.
Findings: Findings from this study suggest a relationship between Phase 2 BPCI
participation and decreased costs. Hospitals participating in the Phase 2 BPCI program had
total episode costs that were $3,333 per episode lower than hospitals participating in the
Phase 1 BPCI program. There was no statistically significant evidence of decreased
readmissions for Phase 2 BPCI participants.
Practice Implications: Findings from this study have direct implications for ongoing
episode-based payment initiatives aimed at improving quality and decreasing costs, as they
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suggest that episode-based payment models have the potential to decrease total costs per
episode.
Keywords: BPCI, bundling, episode-based payment models, care management,
care navigation, Medicare, arthroplasty, total joint replacement
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The New Era of Health Care: Catholic Health Initiatives Journey with Bundled
Payment for Care Improvement in Total Joint Replacements
Introduction
As health care shifts into a new era of reform, providers and payers are testing
innovative payment models in an effort to keep healthcare costs down while improving
quality. The Affordable Care Act issued the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) a directive to form an innovation center to explore new payment models that would
begin shifting from a pay-for-service model to a pay-for-value model (Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services [CMS], 2010). Developing the capacity to provide value-based
health care has become the goal of healthcare providers.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act “marks the U.S. government’s
commitment to the widespread adoption of patient-centered approaches, coordinated
models of care, and rational reimbursement” (Dinan, Simmons, & Snyderman, 2010, p.
1665). The Institute for Healthcare Improvement established the triple aim framework for
all value programs in order to: (a) improve an individual’s experience of care, (b) improve
the health of the population, and (c) reduce the costs of care (Vetter, Boudreaux, Jones,
Hunter, & Pittet, 2014). Value in this new-era healthcare market will achieve higher quality
outcomes with improved efficiency and providers will be expected to provide care across
the continuum (King, 2013).
Background
Traditional healthcare delivery systems are not capable of meeting the needs of the
patient population or providing the necessary resources to address the rapid growth of
chronic diseases in the United States (Ferrario, Moore, & Copeland, 2009). Because the
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resources currently being utilized are unable to be sustained, the CMS began exploring
value-based payment models as an alternative to how health care is delivered in the United
States. An Institute of Medicine report highlighted the need for change, estimating that “30
to 40 cents of every health care dollar is spent on inappropriate, duplicative, or ineffective
care, costing the nation between $600 and $700 billion annually” (as cited in Shomaker,
2010, p. 756). Surgical care alone “currently accounts for an estimated 52% of hospital
admission expenses in the United States” (Vetter et al., 2014, p. 1131). The Affordable
Care Act includes provisions to improve the quality of care; develop new models of care
delivery (i.e., care redesign); ensure appropriately priced services; modernize the U.S.
health system; and fight against waste, fraud, and abuse (Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services [CMS], 2010).
Borah et al. (2012) described the shift to value-based care as a bold transformation
by Medicare to become actively involved in quality of outcomes for Medicare
beneficiaries. The current Medicare fee-for-service model supports volume rather than
quality, which can lead to misaligned incentives for providers and payers to collaborate
and coordinate better care for beneficiaries (Delisle, 2013). In order to make the shift to a
value-based care model that rewards physicians and health systems for quality outcomes
(Froimson, Deadwiler, Schill, & Cousineau, 2013), care redesign is required. The current
healthcare system leaves the care of Medicare beneficiaries uncoordinated and increases
healthcare costs to an unsustainable level (Hackbarth, Reischauer, & Mutti, 2008).
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services: BPCI Program
The BPCI model is a new, innovative, episode-based payment approach that
focuses on improving patient experience and quality while decreasing costs. The primary
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goal of the BPCI program is to redesign the care delivery model by increasing care
coordination among providers. The bundled payment model is designed to incentivize
providers to provide the right care at the right time, while shifting risk from the payer to
the provider (Averill, Goldfield, Hughes, Eisenhandler, & Vertrees, 2009). The BPCI
program is based on the belief that providers should look beyond a single setting of care to
an entire episode of care to improve clinical outcomes (Tian, DeJong, Munin, & Smout,
2010). The program moves the focus from accountability for a procedure or hospitalization
to accountability for improving the total episode of care (Pappas, 2013). While the BPCI
program does not attempt to control the volume of care, estimates are that by increasing
the coordination of care, it could “result in a 5.4% reduction in national health care
spending” (Shomaker, 2010, p. 757).
Episode-based payments bundle all Medicare payments for services related to a
clinical condition for a determined amount of time. The goal of the model is to decrease
the fragmented care delivery system by aligning all payment incentives among the
providers of care for a Medicare beneficiary. The CMS created 48 different clinical
episodes in BPCI program and offered providers the ability to provide care for a 30-, 60-,
or 90-day episode of care. The episodes of care are linked to diagnosis-related groups
(DRGs), and the BPCI episode of care is triggered when a Medicare beneficiary with the
selected BPCI DRG enters an acute care hospital.
The program has two phases. In Phase 1, the CMS provides health care facilities
with monthly claims data for episodes of care for learning purposes, but there is no financial
risk to the provider Once facilities enter Phase 2 of the program (which is optional), they
are held accountable for downside financial risk if they do not achieve the episode target
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prices set by the CMS. Upon official CMS launch of the BPCI program on January 1, 2013,
more than 500 hospitals, health systems, and other providers enrolled; 191 of those
facilities enrolled in Model 2 (Herman, 2013). The first participants started the Phase 2
program on October 1, 2013.While the participants entering Phase 2 of the program agree
to a 3-year commitment to the program, the CMS does offer provisions to opt out of Phase
2 if requested. The most common clinical episodes participants selected were: (a) major
joint replacement (78%), (b) congestive heart failure (58%), (c) coronary artery bypass
graft (51%), (d) chronic obstructive pulmonary disease–bronchitis/asthma (49%), and (e)
percutaneous coronary intervention (48%) (Herman, 2013).
Catholic Health Initiatives: The New Era of Health Care
This study examines the Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI) experience with the CMS
BPCI program. The current CHI area of expertise in this program is in the area of major
joint replacement of the lower extremity. As one of the nation’s largest faith-based health
systems, CHI serves more than four million people each year with 105 hospitals in 19
states. About 46 million people—or nearly 15% of the U.S. population—live within a 60mile radius of a CHI hospital (Catholic Health Initiatives, 2014).
Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI) entered into the Phase 2 BPCI project as an
awardee convener on October 1, 2013 for St. Vincent Medical Center in Little Rock, AR.
St. Vincent Medical Center was one of only thirteen hospitals across the nation to go “at
risk” during this first phase, out of a total of 450 hospitals/post-acute providers across 44
states that originally applied to the CMS (CMS, 2013). St. Vincent Medical Center entered
into the BPCI program to manage MS-DRGs 469/470, major joint replacement of the lower
extremity (i.e., hip/knee arthroplasty). On January 1, 2014, CHI acted as the convener for
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three additional facilities to enter the program to manage MS-DRGs 469/470: (a) Alegent
Mercy Medical Center in Council Bluffs, IA; (b) Good Samaritan Medical Center in
Kearney, NE; and (c) St. Elizabeth Medical Center in Lincoln, NE.

Conceptual Framework
Study Purpose/Hypotheses
This study focuses on the relationship between total costs of care/total readmission
rates per episode for Medicare patients undergoing major joint replacement of the lower
extremity (knee/hip arthroplasty) at Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI) facilities
participating in the BPCI program. The research hypotheses of the study were: 1)
Participation in Phase 2 BPCI program improves care coordination which leads to
decreased costs per episode of care; 2) Participation in the Phase 2 BPCI program improves
quality which leads to decreased readmission rates per episode of care.
The two dependent variables were total costs per episode and total readmissions
per episode. The independent variables tested were (a) age; (b) gender; (c) phase of BPCI
participation; (d) case mix index (CMI); and (e) site of service (surgery): IA-Alegent, NESt. Elizabeth, NE-Good Samaritan, or AR-St. Vincent. The intercept independent variable
composition utilized for the regression analysis was: female, age 20-30, Phase 1 BPCI
participation, and CMI 2.1 or less (See Appendix: Figure 1).
Methods
Sample and Databases
This study was based on complete Medicare claims data for Medicare beneficiaries
in the clinical episode of care DRGs 469/470: major joint replacement of the lower
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extremity (i.e., hip/knee arthroplasty) who (a) received surgery at one of the four CHI
facilities (St. Vincent, Alegent Mercy, Good Samaritan, or St. Elizabeth) and (b)
participated in both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 BPCI programs. The CHI BPCI facility
geographic representation includes the states of Arkansas, Iowa, and Nebraska. The
assumption was that the hospitals selected were similar in economic, political, and other
market competitive forces.
The unit of analysis for this study was individual patients who were eligible for
participation in the BPCI program by having total hip or knee arthroplasty at one of the
BPCI participating facilities. In this program, the CMS defines: one patient = one episode.
The data contain all tracked program metrics by patient (i.e., episode) for the duration of
the 90-day BPCI program for each facility participating in the program. Data came from
one primary source: CMS claims reports for all episodes for each participating BPCI
facility. The CMS protects the privacy of health data by removing all patient identifying
data fields; there is no way to track the data back to an individual beneficiary. The CMS
data included historical/baseline data from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2012. Additionally, the
CMS provides monthly data reports that outline the current episodes of care that have been
completed.
We focused on major joint replacement of the lower extremity joint episodes. Data
was limited to facilities that had both Phase 1 and Phase 2 data. Beneficiaries with more
than one episode were excluded to ensure each participant was a first-time BPCI
participant. Gender and case mix index (CMI) were converted to categorical variables.
Readmission count and total costs per episode were used as continuous variables. A total
of 2,603 observations were utilized.
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Study Design
We used an ANOVA analysis to assess the relationship between total allowed costs
per episode and total readmissions per episode between Phase 1 and Phase 2 BPCI program
participation. Episode payments and readmissions were examined at the episode level.
We used a regression analysis to assess the relationship between total costs of the
episode and total readmissions per episode on age, gender, BPCI phase, CMI, and site of
service location.
Analysis
For each patient, we obtained the total episode bundle cost by summing the index
hospitalization payments with the postoperative post-acute costs to compute the total 90day episode of care cost. Readmissions in this program are defined as any inpatient acute
hospital admission following the BPCI trigger inpatient admission that occurs during the
90-day episode period. The CMS provides a readmission exclusion list for the BPCI
program; thus, any inpatient admission DRG listed on the CMS exclusion list was removed
from the total readmission count. The data relating to total costs per episode and
readmissions were collected and analyzed. The year that the Phase 2 BPCI facilities entered
the program (2013 or 2014) served as the base year for data analysis. The assumption was
that the care coordination process and performance improvements required to achieve
savings in the first year of the Phase 2 BPCI program would be demonstrable. The study
was limited to one year (i.e., the first year of Phase 2 BPCI program participation) due to
data availability and the limited sample of CHI hospitals that are currently participating in
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the program. The data for the study were collected from CMS claims data files for all
relevant MS-DRG episodes in the participating facilities.
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
The total sample size was 2,603 episodes, with 92% of the BPCI program
participants between 61 and 90 years of age. The largest number of participants included
in this study was from the geographic region of Nebraska, at 57% of the total sample.
Arkansas was the next highest represented (29%), and the smallest population came from
Iowa (14%). Females made up 63% of the sample and males represented 37% of the group.
Ninety-five percent of the sample had a CMI of 2.1 or less. Table 1 (See Appendix) presents
the descriptive statistics on variables used to test Hypothesis 1 and 2.
Findings
Findings from this study suggest a relationship between Phase 2 BPCI participation
and decreased costs with inpatient lower extremity total joint replacement. Hospitals
participating in the Phase 2 BPCI program had total episode costs of $3,333 per episode
lower than facilities participating in the Phase 1 BPCI program. There was no statistically
significant evidence of decreased readmissions for Phase 2 BPCI participants.
ANOVA Testing Summary: Total Costs per Episode
A statistically significant difference existed between the mean of Phase 1 and Phase
2 populations based on total allowed costs per episode (p value: <0.0001). Phase 1
participants had a higher average total allowed per episode compared to Phase 2
participants. Costs for the Phase 1 facilities were $25,171 per episode compared to the costs
of $21,838 for Phase 2 facilities. Phase 2 participants achieved a total cost per episode
reduction of $3,333 (See Appendix: Table 2). Table 2 provides support for Hypothesis 1:
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Participation in Phase 2 BPCI program improves care coordination which leads to
decreased costs per episode of care.
ANOVA Testing Findings: Total Readmissions per Episode
No statistically significant difference existed between the mean of Phase 1 and
Phase 2 populations based on total readmissions per episode. Phase 1 participants had a
slightly higher average readmit count compared to Phase 2 participants (See Appendix:
Table 3). Table 3 reflects that no support was established for Hypothesis 2: Participation
in the Phase 2 BPCI program improves quality which leads to decreased readmission rates
per episode of care.
Regression Analysis Testing: Total Costs Allowed per Episode
The independent variables of age, gender, BPCI Phase 2 participation, CMI, and
site of service/surgery all impact total costs per episode. A higher age and higher CMI (3.4
or higher) demonstrated statistically significant increases to total costs per episode. The
lowest costs per episode were achieved by participants with the following characteristics:
(a) male, (b) a CMI of 2.1 or lower, (c) in a Phase 2 BPCI program, and (d) surgery in
Arkansas/St. Vincent Medical Center (See Appendix: Table 4).
Regression Analysis Testing: Total Readmissions Allowed per Episode
No statistically significant difference existed between the mean of Phase 1 and
Phase 2 populations based on total readmissions per episode. Phase 1 participants had a
higher average total readmission count per episode compared to Phase 2 participants. An
increased age and higher CMI appeared to have an impact on total readmissions, but not a
statistically significant impact could be proven with this research study. Of note, the total
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volume of readmissions for this study was 332 of 2,602 cases; thus, the sample size may
have limited the regression analysis findings (See Appendix: Table 5).
Although not statistically significant, Phase 2 BPCI participation did reflect a
relationship between readmissions reduction in increased age and higher CMI groups; this
is positive, as it shows the program can have an impact on improving quality for total joint
replacement patients.
Some limitations for this research study include: (a) reliance on CMS claims data;
(b) inclusion of only CHI facilities in the sample; (c) only one clinical episode represented;
(d) limited sample size; and (e) comparing facilities not matched by size, geographic area,
number of cases, or number of surgeons participating in the program.

Practice Implications
Findings from this study have direct implications for ongoing episode-based
payment initiatives aimed at improving quality and patient experience while decreasing
costs. Our findings suggest that episode-based payment models have the potential to
decrease total costs per episode. The study focus of total knee arthroplasty as a BPCI
episode is important, as the available data reveal that total knee arthroplasty is now among
the most common major surgical procedures, with approximately 600,000 total knee
procedures, at an expense of $9 billion per year, performed annually in the United States
(Cram et al., 2012). In this estimation of 600,000 total knee procedures per year in the
United States, our research predicts that the implementation of the BPCI model could result
in an overall savings of approximately $2 billion per year. For CHI alone, our research
indicates that the Phase 2 BPCI program reduced total costs for the 1,279 episodes by a

51

total of $4.2 million. CHI did not maintain 100% of those savings, but positive savings
ratios were still achieved in this program by CHI.
The results of this study do not directly suggest that episode-based payment models
improve quality outcomes, but the positive relationships on the BPCI model with
readmission reduction in relationship to age and CMI warrant more study. Future research
could include a more intense focus on patients in the program that are older and have a
CMI of 3.4 or greater in order to focus on the ability of this model to produce significant
reductions in total readmissions.
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Tables
Table 1
Description of Sample
Sample
Total Sample Count

Total Count
2,603

% of Sample
100%

Gender
Female
Male

1,646
957

63%
37%

BPCI Phase
Phase 1 Episodes
Phase 2 Episodes

1,324
1,279

51%
49%

CMI
CMI 2.1 or less
CMI 3.4 or more

2,486
117

95%
5%

Age
Age 21-30
Age 31-40
Age 41-50
Age 51-60
Age 61-70
Age 71-80
Age 81-90
Age 90-100

2
7
41
97
808
1,099
484
65

<1%
<1%
2%
4%
31%
42%
19%
2%

Facility
IA: Alegent Mercy
NE: Good Samaritan
NE: St. Elizabeth
AR: St. Vincent

365
669
815
754

14%
26%
31%
29%
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Table 2
ANOVA: Total Costs per Episode
Participation
Total Sample Size
Total Costs
Phase
Phase 1
1,324
$25,171
Phase 2
1,279
$21,838
Cost Reduction
1,279 Episodes
$(3,333)
per Episode
CHI Total Cost
1,279 Episodes
$4,262,907
a
Reduction
NotesaCMS cost savings reduction reflects total difference from Phase 1 CMS allowed
payments and Phase 2 CMS allowed payments.
F Value= 32.15; Pr > F= <.0001; Confidence interval is 95%; and p value is <0.0001

Table 3
ANOVA: Total Readmissions per Episode
Participation
Total Sample Size
Phase
Phase 1
1,324
Phase 2
1,279
Readmission
1,279 Episodes
Reduction
CHI Total
1,279 Episodes
Note: F Value= 0.57; Pr > F= <.4512

Total
Readmissions
0.09970
0.08913
0.01
0.01
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Table 4
Regression Analysis Summary: Total Costs per Episode
Independent
Description/Observations
Variables
Intercept
Age

Female; Age 21–30; Phase 1; CMI 2.1
For every 1 unit increase in age
category, the total costs increase
Gender
Allowed per episode is lower for
males
Phase
Allowed per episode is lower for
Phase 2
CMI
Allowed per episode is higher for
participants with a higher CMI of 3.4
IA: Alegent
Participants from Mercy have lower
Mercy
costs per episode by parameter estimate
NE: St.
Participants from St. Elizabeth have
Elizabeth
lower costs per episode by parameter
estimate
AR:
Participants from St. Vincent have
St. Vincent
lower costs per episode by parameter
estimate
NE: Good
Participants from Good Samaritan
Samaritan
have lower costs per episode by
parameter estimate
Note: F value= 87.27; p value= <0.001; R-square= 0.19

Total Impact of Independent
Variables on Total Costs Per
Episode
$11,125
$3,697
($1,671)
($1,870)
$16,509
($6,350)
($3,293)
($8,930)
($7,448)
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Table 5
Regression Analysis Summary: Total Readmissions per Episode
Independent
Description/Observations
Variables
Intercept
Age
Gender
Phase
CMI

2.1

Female; Age 21–30; Phase 1; CMI

For every 1 unit increase in age
category, the total readmissions
increase
No effect of gender on readmit
count
No effect of phase on readmit count
Readmits per episode are higher for
participants with a higher CMI of 3.4
No effect of facility on readmit count

IA: Alegent
Mercy
NE: St.
No effect of facility on readmit count
Elizabeth
AR:
No effect of facility on readmit count
St. Vincent
NE: Good
No effect of facility on readmit count
Samaritan
Note: F value= 5.27; p value= <0.0001; R-square= 0.014

Total Impact of Independent
Variables on Total Readmissions
per Episode
-0.01121
0.02099
0.01933
-0.00675
0.13179
-0.02269
-0.00063600
-0.00861
-0.02
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Figures

Independent Variables
1) Age
2) Gender
3) Phase of BPCI Participation
4) CMI
5) Site of Service: IA-Alegent, NESt. Elizabeth, AR-St. Vincent, NEGood Samaritan
Independent Variables
1) Age
2) Gender
3) Phase of BPCI Participation
4) CMI
5) Site of Service: IA-Alegent, NESt. Elizabeth, AR-St. Vincent, NEGood Samaritan

•

Dependent Variable
• Total Costs per Episode

• Intercept Independent Variable Description: Female;
Age 21-30; Phase 1; CMI 2.1 or less

• Dependent Variable
• Total Readmissions per Episode
• Intercept Independent Variable Description: Female;
Age 21-30; Phase 1; CMI 2.1 or less

Figure 1: Conceptualized relationships among variables
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APPENDICES

Figure 1: BPCI Model 2: Key Roles
Key Roles
CHI: BPCI Oversight Steering Committee

BPCPI Program Responsibilities
Manage the operations of BPCI Model 2
and oversee all MBO participants in the
program, including:
 Operational oversight of care
redesign
 Governance and oversight of BPCI
shared savings pools
 Governance and oversight of BPCI
Episode Initiator (EI) performance
 Governance and oversight of BPCI
participating physician
performance
Conduct oversight and approvals to
ensure that Awardees,
EpisodeInitiators,EIPs, Gain sharers are in
compliance with the terms and conditions
of the Agreement, including development
and reporting of required policies,
procedures, program operations and
quality metrics.

CHI: Program Director

Operational oversight of the care redesign;
Serves an internal consultant to the local
market BPCI teams to assist in launching
and maintaining BPCI programs; Shares
best practice learnings and lessons learned
for all teams participating in the BPCI
program
Provides analysis of BPCI results;
Completed quarterly gain sharing reports
for the local markets and the local
physicians participating in the program
Provides monthly reports to the BPCI
teams on key indicators of the program for
tracking success and opportunities for
improvement

CHI: Financial Analyst

CHI: Data Analyst/Reporting
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Local Market: Project Manager/Lead

Provides daily oversight to the BPCI
project; Ensures that all required steering
committee meetings are held; Reports
required CHI BPCI program tracking to
CHI Program Director
Local Market: Physician Champion and Provides leadership for the care redesign
Leader of the Steering Committee
activities; Provides leadership for the
steering committee
Local Market: Continuing Care Network Develops the CCN for the market,
Leader
establishes quality metrics for CCN
participants and tracks metrics for
performance
Local Market: Acute Hospital Care Provides discharge planning services
Management Team
Local
Market:
Care
Management Provided pre-op and post-op navigation for
Navigators
the BPCI participants for 120 days
following surgery
Local
Market:
Pre-Op
Education Leads the required pre-op education course
Coordinator
for participants/family members
Local Market: Interdisciplinary Team: Serves on the steering committee and
Nursing,
Therapy,
Pre-Op
team, works as a team to ensure the BPCI
Hospitalists/PCP’s; Pharmacy
participants have a highest quality and
highest satisfaction possible
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Figure 2: ANOVA: Total Cost Per Episode: DRG 469/470
The ANOVA Procedure

Class Level Information
Class

Levels Values

Phase 2

01

Number of Observations Read 2603
Number of Observations Used 2603
The ANOVA Procedure
Dependent Variable: Total_Allowed_Per_Episode Total Allowed Per Episode

Source

DF

Sum of Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F

Model

1

7224322679.8

Error

2601 584406007853

7224322679.8 32.15

<.0001

224685124.13

Corrected Total 2602 591630330532
R-Square Coeff Var Root MSE Total_Allowed_Per_Episode Mean
0.012211 63.69377

14989.50

Source DF Anova SS
Phase

1

23533.70
Mean Square F Value Pr > F

7224322680 7224322680

32.15

<.0001

Scheffe's Test for Total_Allowed_Per_Episode
Note: This test controls the Type I experimentwise error rate.

Alpha

0.05

Error Degrees of Freedom

2601

Error Mean Square

2.2469E8

Critical Value of F

3.84504

Minimum Significant Difference 1152.4
Harmonic Mean of Cell Sizes

1301.111

78
Note: Cell sizes are not equal.

Means with the same letter
are not significantly different.
Scheffe Grouping Mean

N

Phase

A

25171.1 1324 1

B

21838.7 1279 2

Observations:
1. Statistically significant difference exists between the mean of phase I and Phase II
populations based on Total allowed per episode.
2. Phase I participants have a higher average total allowed per episode ($25,171) as
compared to Phase II participants ($21,838).
3. Confidence interval would be 95% and p value for this test is <0.0001

ANOVA: Total Costs per Episode (Summary)
Participation
Total Sample Size
Total Costs
Phase
Phase 1
1,324
$25,171
Phase 2
1,279
$21,838
Cost Reduction
1,279 Episodes
$(3,333)
per Episode
CHI Total Cost
1,279 Episodes
$4,262,907
Reductiona
Notes:aCMS cost savings reduction reflects total difference from Phase 1 CMS allowed
payments and Phase 2 CMS allowed payments.
F Value= 32.15; Pr > F= <.0001; Confidence interval is 95%; and p value is <0.0001
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Figure 3: Framework for Post-Acute Interventions by Care Management
Navigators
Timing of Intervention
5-7 days prior to Surgery
Joint Academy Course

Focus of Intervention
Prep for Operation
Discharge Planning

Inpatient Interview—
While in Hospital (1st day
after surgery)
48 hours after hospital
discharge

Prep for transition to
home

7-10 days after hospital
discharge

Surgical recovery

Post-First OR Physician
Visit (Usually 14-21 days
after discharge)
30-days after discharge

Any changes to treatment
plan

60-days after discharge

Home plan of care; Any
unexpected issues

Surgical recovery process;
Return of mobility
Return of mobility and
independence

90-days after discharge

Plans for return to normal
activities

120-days after discharge

Completion of care plan

*Additional Calls at
Discretion of the Care
Managers

Follow-Up on issues that
are voiced as concerns by
patient/family/treatment
team
Unexpected developments

*Incoming Calls: From
Patients/Families

Common Findings
Anxiety about Surgery
Unresolved support
issues
Pain; Anxiety about
transition to home
Pain—increasing as
surgical meds have worn
off; Constipation;
Reminders to use ice
packs; Follow-up needed
on medication
reconciliation; Unsure of
post-op appointment
information—need
reminder
Pain; Reminders to use
ice packs; Constipation;
Leaking bandage;
Follow-up needed on
medication reconciliation
Clarification of appt.
overview
Mobility restriction
questions
Return of independence;
Patient satisfaction with
the process
Return of independence;
Patient satisfaction with
the process
Patient satisfaction;
Closure of the episode
with the care manager
Varies

Unable to find post-op
appt. information or postop recovery instructions
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Figure 4: ANOVA Total Readmissions Rates Per Episode: DRG 469/470
Dependent Variable: Readmit_count Readmit_count
Source

DF

Sum of Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F

Model

1

0.0726248

Error

2601 332.6788158

0.0726248

0.57

0.4512

0.1279042

Corrected Total 2602 332.7514406
R-Square Coeff Var Root MSE Readmit_count Mean
0.000218 378.4264

0.357637

Source DF Anova SS
Phase 1
The ANOVA Procedure

0.094506

Mean Square F Value Pr > F

0.07262482 0.07262482

0.57

0.4512

Scheffe's Test for Readmit_count
Note: This test controls the Type I experimentwise error rate.
Alpha

0.05

Error Degrees of Freedom

2601

Error Mean Square

0.127904

Critical Value of F

3.84504

Minimum Significant Difference 0.0275
1301.111

Harmonic Mean of Cell Sizes
Means
with
the
same
are not significantly different.

letter

Scheffe Grouping Mean

Phase

A

N

0.09970 1324 1

A
A

0.08913 1279 2

Observations:
1. No Statistically significant difference exists between the mean of phase I and
Phase II populations based on readmissions.
2. Phase I participants have a slightly higher average readmit count ( 0.099)as
compared to Phase II participants (0.089).
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ANOVA: Total Readmissions per Episode (Summary)
Participation
Total Sample Size
Total
Phase
Readmissions
Phase 1
1,324
0.09970
Phase 2
1,279
0.08913
Readmission
1,279 Episodes
0.01
Reduction
CHI Total
1,279 Episodes
0.01
Note: F Value= 0.57; Pr > F= <.4512

82

Figure 5: Navigator Call Script Example: 48 hour post-discharge call
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Note: Provided by TAVHealth
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Figure 6: Volume of Patient Engagement Calls: Incoming/Outgoing: St. Vincent
Medical Center, Little Rock AR

Note: Provided by TAVHealth
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Figure 7: Continuing Care Network: Expectations of SNF Partners
CHI Nebraska (Example)
Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) Credentialing Criteria for Participation in Continuing
Care Network (CCN) of the CHI Clinically Integrated Network (CCN) Nebraska
1. Easy access for hospital’s patient discharges
This means geographic proximity to the hospitals’ primary service areas from which
that hospitals draw the majority of their patients; the ability to have a firm commitment
to the hospital(s) for admission to the skilled nursing facility within two hours of
notification of patient day and time of discharge; facility readiness to admit a patient
24/7, including emergent admissions on weekends, evenings and nights, and,
immediate access to the patient’s room, upon ambulance arrival at the facility.
2. Compliance with federal and state regulations
This means survey deficiencies that are less than average for Nebraska (6.5 as of
August 2013), and no deficiencies in previous three years that would place the facility
in immediate jeopardy or cause actual harm to residents (i.e., no G level or higher level
of deficiencies); no civil money penalties in past three years.
3. Meets or exceeds median for federal quality standards
This means achieving at least a three star rating overall and in each of three categories
as shown on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid’s (CMS’s)Nursing Home
Compare website (Ratings are based on results of inspections, nursing staffing levels
and quality indicators).
4. Thirty-day hospital readmissions rate at or below national, state or CIN
Nebraska norms whichever is lowest. Currently, CIN Nebraska expects the rate
of 30 day readmissions from SNFs to be no greater than 10%.
5. Medical Staff
Attending physicians at the skilled nursing facility shall include one or more primary
care physicians and extenders that are part of hospital’s physician network. This
criterion will become relevant when the SNFist program in Lincoln is launched.
6. Medicare or Short Stay or Sub acute Unit
Facility must have a unit dedicated to short stay post-acute patients who require short
term skilled nursing or rehabilitative services prior to returning home.
7. RN Care Providers
To assure that the skilled nursing facilities in the CCN can effectively manage
the care of hospitals’ patient discharges, skilled nursing facilities must have an
RN providing care in the Medicare/Short Stay/Sub acute Unit 24/7.
8. Nursing Ratios
While nursing staffing levels are encompassed with CMS’s Five Star rating
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system, skilled nursing facilities in the CCN must have a ratio of at least one
RN to 15 Medicare A or A/B patients to best assure quality outcomes.
9. Seven Day Therapies
Skilled nursing facilities in the CCN must provide necessary therapies to
Medicare A or A/B patients in the short stay/sub acute/Medicare unit seven
days a week to assure that patients are actively engaged in their skilled nursing
and therapies throughout their stay. This includes twice a day therapies seven
days per week.
10. Medicare A or A/B Patient Average Length of Stay
For post-acute patients, skilled nursing facilities in the CCN must have an
average length of stay (ALOS)for Medicare patients that is at or less than 21
days. For patients with joint replacements who were discharged as MS-DRG
469 or 470, SNF ALOS is expected to be < 9 days.
11. Discharge to Community
For post-acute patients, skilled nursing facilities in the CCN must discharge at
least 60% of short-stay Medicare patients (not formerly long-term care
residents) to the community.
12. Use of Interact and 3.0 Tools
Skilled nursing facilities in the CCN must actively use the Interact 3.0 tools
(fully implemented and used effectively by all nursing staff), including the
advance care planning tools. INTERACT (Interventions to Reduce Acute
Care Transfers) is a quality improvement program that focuses on the
management of acute change in a skilled nursing facility patient’s condition. It
includes clinical and educational tools and strategies for use in every day
practice in skilled nursing facilities. The goal of INTERACT is to improve care
and reduce the frequency of potentially avoidable transfers to the acute hospital.

Note: Provided by CHI
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Table 1: BPCI: Summary of Program Models

Episode

Model 1:
Retrospective
Acute-Care
Hospital Stay
Only
All MS-DRGs

Services
Included in the
bundle

Part A services
during the
inpatient stay

Payment

Retrospective

Model 2:
Retrospective
Acute Hospital
Stay plus PostAcute Care
Selected
DRG’s + PostAcute Care
Part A and B
services during
the inpatient
stay, post-acute
period and
readmissions
Retrospective

Model 3:
Retrospective
Post-Acute
Care Only

Model 4:
Prospective
Acute Care
Hospital Stay
Only
Post-acute only Selected DRGs
for selected
DRGs
Part A and B
All Part A and
services during B services
the post-acute
(hospital,
period and
physician) and
readmissions
readmissions
Retrospective

Prospective

Note: Levine, M. (September, 2014). Providing value: Delivery System Innovation. Presented
at Catholic Health Learning Lab, Denver, CO.
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Table 2: BPCI: Clinical Episodes
Acute myocardial infarction
Lower extremity and humerus procedure
except hip, foot, femur
AICD
Amputation
Artherosclerosis
Back and neck except spinal fusion
Coronary artery bypass graft
Cardiac defibrillator
Cardiac valve
Cellulitis
Cervical spinal fusion
Chest pain
Combined anterior posterior spinal fusion
Complex non-cervical spinal fusion
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
bronchitis, asthma
Diabetes
Double joint replacement of the lower
extremity
Esophagitis, gastroenteritis and other
digestive disorders
Fractures of the femur and hip or pelvis
Gastrointestinal hemorrhage
Gastrointestinal obstruction
Hip and femur procedures expect major
joint
Transient ischemia

Major bowel procedure
Major cardiovascular procedure
Major joint replacement of the lower
extremity
Major joint replacement of the upper
extremity
Medical non-infectious orthopedic
Medical peripheral vascular disorders
Nutritional and metabolic disorders
Other knee procedures
Other respiratory
Other vascular surgery
Pacemaker
Pacemaker device replacement or revision
Percutaneous coronary intervention
Red blood cell disorders
Removal of orthopedic devices
Renal failure
Revision of the hip or knee
Sepsis
Simple pneumonia and respiratory
infections
Spinal fusion (non-cervical)
Stroke
Syncope & collapse
Urinary tract infection

Note: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2013). Bundled Payment for Care
Improvement Initiative (BPCI) background on model 2 for prospective participants. Retrieved
from http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/BPCI_Model2Background.pdf.
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Table 3: Summary of BPCI Model 2: Retrospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Plus PostAcute Care

Examples of organizations that may
participate in Model 2







Acute care hospitals
Health systems
Physician hospital organizations
Physician group practices
Conveners of health care providers

Entities that can initiate episodes in Model
2
Criteria for beneficiary inclusion in
episode





Acute care hospitals
Physician group practices
The beneficiary is eligible for Part
A and enrolled in Part B
Receives inpatient hospital care at
an Episode Initiator
The beneficiary must not have End
Stage Renal Disease
The beneficiary must not be
enrolled in any managed care plan
(for example, Medicare
Advantage)
The beneficiary must not be
covered under United Mine
Workers; and
Medicare must be the primary
payer
Acute care hospital admission by
Episode Initiator for included
clinical conditions (identified via
MS-DRG)
30, 60, or 90 days after hospital
discharge
Physicians’ services
Inpatient hospital services
Inpatient hospital readmission
services
Long term acute hospital services
(LTHC)
Inpatient rehabilitation facility
services (IRF)
Skilled nursing facility services
(SNF)







Start of episode



End of episode



Types of services included in bundle,
which include broad episode categories
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Payment to CMS to Providers and
Suppliers
Discount provided to Medicare are
defined by episode length








Reconciliation



Home health agency services
(HHA)
Hospital outpatient services
Independent outpatient therapy
services
Clinical laboratory services
Durable medical equipment
Part B drugs
Traditional FFS payments
3% discount for episodes of 30 or
60 days in length
2% discount for episodes 90 days
in length
Medicare pays the Awardee the
difference between the target price
and the actual cost of care for an
episode if the actual cost is less
than the target price. If the actual
cost of care exceeds the target
price, the Awardee pays Medicare
the difference between the target
price and actual spending

Note: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2013). Bundled Payment for Care
Improvement Initiative (BPCI) background on model 2 for prospective participants. Retrieved
from http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/BPCI_Model2Background.pdf.

91

Table 4: BPCI: Phase Summary (Models 2-4)
Phase 1
Phase 1 represents the initial period of
participant preparation for implementation
and assumption of financial risk
Selection is based on CMS’ review and
acceptance of proposed care redesign
plans and program integrity screening

Participants receive:
 Monthly beneficiary-level claims
data
 Engagement in variety of learning
activities with other BPCI Phase 1
participants
 Baseline pricing information to
inform assessments of
opportunities under BPCI

Phase 2
Phase 2 is the risk-bearing period

To move into Phase 2 as an Awardee,
participants must be offered an agreement
by CMS following a comprehensive
review and enter into an agreement with
CMS
Agreements allow awardees to:
 Bear financial risk for the model
 Continue receiving monthly
beneficiary-level claims data
 May utilize applicable fraud and
abuse waivers and payment policy
waivers (i.e. gain sharing)

Note: Levine, M. (September, 2014). Providing value: Delivery System Innovation. Presented
at Catholic Health Learning Lab, Denver, CO.
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Table 5: Comparison of Payment Reform Models
Accountable
Care
Organization
(Shared
Savings/MSSP)
Makes
providers
accountable for
total costs;
Does not
require patient
“lock-in”;
Reinforced by
other reforms
to promote
coordinated
care
Yes

Primary Care
Medical
Home
(PCMH)

Bundled
Payments

Partial
Capitation

Full Capitation

Supports
primary care
coordination
of care, but
does not
provide
accountability
for total costs
of care

Promotes
efficiency
and care
coordination
within an
episode, but
not total
costs of care

Provides
upfront
payments,
but only
hold
accountable
for services
that fall
under
partial
capitation

Provided upfront
payment and
makes providers
accountable for
costs, but
requires patients
to “lock-in”

Yes

Yes

No—Only
primary care
providers are
incentivized

Yes/No—
Yes
Only for
bundled
payments
that result in
support for
primary
care
Yes
Yes

Yes

No

No

Fosters
Yes
accountability
for total percapita costs

No

Yes, within
episode

General
Strengths and
Weaknesses

Strengthens
primary care
directly or
indirectly

Fosters
Coordination
Among All
Participating
Providers
Removes
payment
incentives to
increase
volume

Yes

Yes

Yes/No—
Yes
Strong
efficiency
incentive
for services
that are part
of model
Yes
Yes
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Requires
providers to
bear risk for
excess costs
Requires
“lock-in” of
patients to
specific
providers

No

No

Yes, within
episode

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes—for
some
depending
on model

Yes

Note: Lowell, K. and Bertko, J. (2010). The accountable care organization (ACO) model:
Building blocks for success. Journal of Ambulatory Care Management, 33(1), 81-88.
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Table 7: BPCI Phase 2: Regression Analysis: Total Costs Per Episode
Regression Analysis Testing
Regression results with Total Allowed per Episode as Dependent Variable
87.27
F value
<0.0001
p value
R-square

0.19

Variable
Intercept
Age
Gender
Phase
CMI
Mercy
Elizabeth
Vincent
Good Sam

Description/Observations
Total allowed per episode for a female in age category 21-30, in Phase 1, with CMI of 2.1
With every 1 unit increase in age category ( so from 21-30 category to 31-40 category and so
Allowed per Episode is lower for Males
Allowed per episode is lower for Phase II
Allowed per episode is higher for participants with higher CMI of 3.4
Participants from Mercy facility have lower allowed per episode by the parameter estimate
Participants from Elizabeth facility have lower allowed per episode by the parameter estimat
Participants from Vincent facility have lower allowed per episode by the parameter estimate
Participants from Good Sam facility have lower allowed per episode by the parameter estima
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Table 8: BPCI Phase 2: Regression Analysis: Total Readmissions per Episode
Regression results with Readmit Count as Dependent Variable
5.27
F value
<0.0001
p value
R-square

0.014

Variable
Intercept
Age
Gender
Phase
CMI
Mercy
Elizabeth
Vincent
Good Sam

Description/Observations
Readmit count for a female in age category 21-30, in Phase 1, with CMI of 2.1 ( Not signific
With every 1 unit increase in age category ( so from 21-30 category to 31-40 category and so
No effect of Gender on Readmit count
No Effect of Phase on Readmit count
Readmit count is higher for participants with higher CMI of 3.4
No effect of Facility on Readmit count
No effect of Facility on Readmit count
No effect of Facility on Readmit count
No effect of Facility on Readmit count
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Sample
Description of Sample
Sample
Total Sample Count
Female
Male
Phase 1 Episodes
Phase 2 Episodes
CMI 2.1 or less
CMI 3.4 or more
Age 21-30
Age 31-40
Age 41-50
Age 51-60
Age 61-70
Age 71-80
Age 81-90
Age 90-100
IA: Alegent Mercy
NE: Good Samaritan
NE: St. Elizabeth
AR: St. Vincent

Total Count
2,603
1,646
957
1,324
1,279
2,486
117
2
7
41
97
808
1,099
484
65
365
669
815
754

% of Sample
100%
63%
37%
51%
49%
95%
5%
<1%
<1%
2%
4%
31%
42%
19%
2%
14%
26%
31%
29%
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